ABSTRACT Faults and malfunctions on complex chemical production systems generate alarm cascades that hinder the work of the operators and make fault diagnosis a complex and challenging task. The core concept of our work is the incorporation of the hierarchical structure of the technology in a multi-temporal sequence mining algorithm to group the large number of variables. The spreading of the effect of malfunctions over the plant is thoroughly traceable on the higher levels of the hierarchy, while the critical elements of the spillover effect can be detected on the lower levels. Confidence-based goal-oriented measures have been proposed to describe the orientation of fault propagation providing a good insight into the causality on a local level of the process, while the network-based representation yields a global view of causal connections. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is presented in terms of the analysis of the alarm and event-log database of an industrial delayed-coker plant, where the complexity of the problem and the size of the event-log database requires a hierarchical constraint-based representation.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problems concerning the management of alarms provided to the operators of chemical production systems are closely interconnected with the fault detection of chemical processes. Alarm management is the efficient design, implementation, operation and maintenance of industrial process alarms. According to the guidelines of the Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA) the purpose of an alarm system is to help the operators to maintain the processes within the normal operating range by redirecting the attention of the operator towards critical plant conditions requiring timely assessment or action [1] . In chemical production plants, as part of the alarm management system, discrete events, e.g. alarms, warnings, operator actions and system messages, are recorded in alarm management databases. However, alarm management guidelines recommended the installation of only one alarm for a single malfunction of a process. In distributed control systems (DCSs) the definition of alarms is of no significant cost, leading to the configuration of more and more alarms with often meaningless alarm levels resulting in the overload of operators. With the analysis of the recorded discrete events of the process it is possible to construct data model-based solutions to determine the root cause of the event series [2] , predict the future events that might occur [3] , determine the frequently occurring operation strategies for advanced automation solutions [4] , and in general to help and reduce the workload of operators.
For the processing of the large amount of historical data recorded in chemical plants different approaches are common, a thorough collection and classification of process history-based fault detection and diagnosis techniques are given by Venkatasubramanian et al. [5] . Among the tools of process engineering and chemometrics, several alarm management solutions can be found as well. The monitoring of principal component analysis (PCA)-based T 2 and Q statistics is recommended by Kondaveeti et al. [6] and Gupta et al. [7] . A Gaussian mixture model has been applied by Wang et al. [8] to monitor multimode processes. Chenaru et al. [9] developed a real-time decision tree analysis methodology based on the multivariate analysis of measured sensor datasets.
However, alarm management databases are mainly formed of discrete events which raises the problem of discrete eventbased solutions. Just to simply reduce the workload of the operator and the number of triggered spurious alarm signals, conventional techniques like alarm limit deadbands [10] , delay timers [11] or filtering [12] have been widely applied. In the case of more advanced techniques, the aim is to identify overlapping and redundant alarms that should be grouped. Such groups can form association rules and can eventually be applied for the detection of failures, the prediction of future events, and the suppression of predictable future alarms. To achieve this, two different approaches are commonly used. First, correlation analysis-based techniques can be applied, where the exploration of frequently co-occurring alarms within a short time period is desired [13] . Second, with the use of advanced data mining algorithms, frequently occurring operational patterns can be searched for consequential alarms and their evolutionary paths [14] .
The data-driven analysis of chemical processes can be significantly improved by capturing the fundamental connectivity relationships of the analysed process [15] . Following this approach, Yim et al. [16] , [17] developed software for the simultaneous consideration of topological information of processes and historical process data. This software has been enhanced into a cause and effect analysing tool [18] and to be able to derive plant connectivity information from process drawings [19] making it ready to merge process models and plant topology. Realising the importance of process hierarchy with regard to finding more informative alarm connections, our group would like to improve a data-mining approach that can effectively handle hierarchical constraints of process topology and is able to reveal more informative alarm cooccurrences whilst simultaneously reduce spurious connections.
Mining association rules that take into account the hierarchical constraints of the process means the formulation of multiple-level association rules. To achieve this, data is needed at multiple levels of abstraction and efficient algorithms for multi-level sequential pattern mining [20] . By viewing the problem in terms of a bottom-up approach, an imaginary chemical technology is assumed, this means that besides showing that in 30 % of the cases the high temperature in the top of the first column is followed by a high pressure in the reboiler of the second column within a defined time window, process experts might be interested that in 90 % of the event series any alarm in the first column is followed by the alarms of the second column, therefore the spillover effect of the malfunction can be revealed. Moreover, this approach can help to neglect alarm patterns that are not supported by the connectivity information of the process. Thus the connection of alarms from distant units of a process can be avoided. The topic of mining multiple-level association rules has been thoroughly studied over the past decades.
Han and Fu proposed a group of algorithms based on a top-down deepening method and the Apriori principle and compared their performance for the mining of multiple-level association rules [20] . Following this approach, the theme of multi-dimensional sequential pattern mining was proposed, integrating the topics of multidimensional analysis and sequential data mining [21] . The algorithms developed by Eavis and Zheng exploit an existing frequent-pattern tree (FP-tree) structure to reveal conventional as well as crosslevel frequent patterns [22] . Realising the problem of mining association rules in very large databases, Tseng proposed the methodology of hierarchical partitioning using a novel data structure, the frequent pattern list (FPL), for mining frequent itemsets [23] . Melo and Völker investigated the problem of mining large knowledge bases such as DBpedia using the hierarchical background knowledge of the database [24] . Examination of the interestingness of the mined association rules was combined with the mining of hierarchical market basket analysis in the work of Zekić-Susac and Has [25] . Devitt et al. [26] analysed network alarm data with the incorporation of network topology constraints to avoid implausible sequences.
The computational complexity of frequent sequence mining algorithms is analytically analysed in [27] and experimentally tested in [28] . The exponentially increasing computational complexity with the scale-up of the size of the mined database is well-apparent from both approaches highlighting the advance of the proposed algorithm that is based on the reduction of the number of items by using the hierarchical structure of the recorded data. However, this results in the significant improvement of the computational performance, this is not the primary aim of our study, but to find more informative sequences, avoid the generation of uninformative ones and to put the revealed frequent sequences into context.
Noticing the importance of alarm management, more and more modern chemical plants record the occurring alarms, warnings and operator actions in response to these situations to monitor the performance of the alarm system. However, in complex and large production plants (especially in refineries) the size of these databases and the diversity of the stored events can easily exceed the processing capacity of process engineers and traditional data mining algorithms. Noting that each event can be clearly classified on every hierarchical level of the production plant, the discrete events that occur can be independently interpreted in terms of these levels of hierarchy. Completing the event log database with the classification of the recorded tag name of the process variable, the specific measuring circuit, asset, operating unit, operating division, etc. can be identified where the specific event happened. This more detailed database helps us to reveal the connections between the subunits of the operation and illustrate how the effect of a malfunction will spillover the examined system.
In the present paper by realising that the mining of frequently occurring alarm sequences in large alarm management databases is almost computationally infeasible due to the generation of spurious sequences of the alarms of distant elements of the process, a methodology for the generation of more informative sequences is proposed. The contribution of the present paper is twofold: firstly, to merge the fields of hierarchical sequence mining and frequent pattern-based alarm management solutions. Since the present algorithms in the literature of hierarchical sequence mining ignore temporality, our formerly introduced multi-temporal sequence mining algorithm is enhanced [3] with the introduction of the hierarchical constraints of the analysed process. By applying the extended algorithm, it is demonstrated how the hierarchical topology of the process assists in the exploration of more informative causal relationships between the alarms and process units, and the generation of longer alarm sequences, therefore, giving an insight into the spillover effect of malfunctions. Secondly, by applying the results of the field of heuristic process mining [29] , measures to quantify the orientation of fault propagation throughout the process have been proposed. These measures provide a good insight into the direction of the connection of process elements on a local level and give the opportunity to define the network of these connections. Using network-theory-based metrics, like PageRank and betweenness centrality measures [30] , the detection of central and ending elements of alarm cascades is presented. Moreover, during the presentation of the results, novel visualisation solutions, like the sunburst plot for the illustration of alarm load on different hierarchical levels, the parallel coordinates for the visualisation of fault propagation over the process, or the network-based representation of the direction of connections during the spillover are presented.
The roadmap of the paper is as follows. The sequence mining problem, the probabilistic interpretation of multitemporal sequences, and the proposed algorithm are described in Sections II-A, II-B and II-C, respectively. Section II-D describes the measures proposed for the quantification of alarm spreading and Section II-E introduces the proposed novel visualisation solutions of both the sequences and the detected spillover effect. The description of the analysed industrial dataset in Section III-A is followed by the evaluation of the hierarchical sequences of alarms in Section III-B (the methodology and implementation of preprocessing and data cleaning are presented in Appendix B-C, respectively). The effect and extent of the spillover effect with regard to malfunctions are analysed in Section III-C using the proposed probability measures and network-based representation. Finally, the discussion of the limitations and of the future work is followed by concluding remarks in the Conclusions section.
II. HIERARCHICAL MINING OF MULTI-TEMPORAL ALARM SEQUENCES
In this section, first the formulation of hierarchical multitemporal alarm sequences is described in Section II-A, then the probabilistic interpretation of these temporal sequences is proposed in Section II-B and the proposed sequence mining algorithm described in Section II-C. Finally, how the resultant sequences can be used to detect the critical elements of alarm cascades and the applied novel visualisation techniques are discussed in Section II-D and Section II-E, respectively.
A. HIERARCHICAL MULTI-TEMPORAL ALARM SEQUENCES
In almost every chemical plant discrete events, alarms or warnings are recorded when a process variable exceeds a predefined threshold. These alarms, warnings, operator actions, system messages and any further time-stamped information form the alarm and event-log database. For simplicity, only the alarms of this alarm and event-log database are considered. These alarms can be treated as the states of the technology. For further mathematical formulation, each state, denoted by s, is represented by < pv, a > data couples in the state description dataset, where pv is the index of the process variable, and a is the attribute showing the type of the event on the given process value such as a {Low A, Low W , High W , High A}, where A stands for alarm and W for warning (if a is an alarm or warning). For example, the description of a state can be represented as follows: s e := < Furnace Inlet Temperature, High A >.
For a complex production system, with n h hierarchical levels, the place of origin of the pv process value can be determined from the bottom level of the tag names to the top level of plant hierarchy as well. In the present article, the guidelines of the ISA-95 standard are followed [31] , which recommends the application of the following hierarchical levels (enumerated in top-down order): enterprise, site, area, production unit, unit, and the level of sensors and actuators (although the standard focuses on the first four levels). A didactic example is illustrated in Figure 1 for clarification, supposing a refinery site of an enterprise, with the delayed coker and distillation areas illustrated. These areas can be further divided into production units, such us columns, reactors, separators, etc. Production units are composed of units, furnaces, pumps and any further parts of the production units. At the bottom level of the presented hierarchy, the sources of signals are presented, i.e. the sensors and actuators. Following this concept, the pv process indicator can represent the origin of the discrete event on the given hierarchical level (h). Therefore, it is a function of the hierarchical level (pv(h)).
In this context, the previous example of high inlet temperature can be expanded to the higher hierarchical levels, as happened in the Furnace #1 unit, which is the unit of the Coker Column #1 production unit, in the Delayed Coker area of the Refinery, etc., on any arbitrary levels. state can correspond to one or more events as well. An event can relate to the state s e as follows: < s e , 12, 14 >. Here it should be highlighted that the events are the occurrences of different states and each state has its own interpretation on different hierarchical levels. Therefore, the frequently cooccurring events show the connection between different hierarchical parts of the analysed system.
In an industrial environment, by sorting the recorded discrete events into ascending order based on their start time an event-log database can be formed. As clarification, an illustrative example of the connection between the hierarchy of the process and the occurring temporal events is provided by Figure 2 . The three production units are marked with 1, 2 and 3 in brackets and the states of the events occurring in these production units are s 1 , s 2 and s 3 , respectively. The units of the production units are marked with an additional comma-separated superscripted number, therefore, the states s 1,1 , s 1,2 , s 2,1 , etc., are present. On the bottom level of sensors and actuators the notation of s 1,1,1 , s 1,1,2 , etc., is used therefore, the notation of the state of an event on the lowest hierarchical level clearly indicates which process variable (sensor/actuator) raised the alarm in the corresponding unit and production unit. The left side of Figure 2 Since periods of faultless production exist in our system, an event trace of events between two periods of faultless production can be defined, assuming some kind of causal connection between the events of the same event trace. The definition of event traces is explained in detail in Section III. In the presented example the occurring events are assumed to be present in the same first event trace. Table 1 shows the DB alarm management database of the occurring events completed with the hierarchical states of the process.
To reveal connected events a time window needs to be defined. Assuming an event e 1 with a time interval of TABLE 1. Example DB event log database representing an event with its event trace, event id, the occurring state in the specific event on three different levels of process hierarchy and the start and end time of the event.
(st 1 , et 1 ), the time constraint defined as C 1 = (st 1 , et 1 + window) is the time window of e 1 . For a e 2 , st 2 C 1 satisfies the window constraint of e 1 . This time window determines the temporal lag in which two events are considered as correlated. Given two events e 1 and e 2 with time intervals (st 1 , et 1 ) and (st 2 , et 2 ), respectively, four different types of temporal connections are defined: ⇒ e 3 can be found. Similarly, in the present of a set of states S and the temporal predicates defined above, the temporal connection of states can be presented as well: a pattern of k + 1 states, connected with k temporal predicates is referred to as a klength temporal pattern or a k + 1 state temporal pattern and is denoted by k . Following this approach the following be defined:
• k = 0-length patterns, where 0 := s 0 , s 0 S (this trivial pattern with only one state, e.g. "low inlet", is referred to as a degenerated temporal pattern)
• k = 1-length pattern formulated as 1 := ( 0
If a temporal instance of events such as φ := e 1 R ⇒ e 2 and a temporal pattern like := s 1 R ⇒ s 2 are present, where s 1 and s 2 are the states that occur in events e 1 and e 2 , respectively, then the temporal pattern is supported by the φ temporal instance.
The temporal patterns with at least 3 connected states are called multi-temporal patterns. Given two multitemporal patterns k :
.., j m is a series of sequential natural numbers, then is known as a sequential sub-pattern of .
B. PROBABILISTIC INTERPRETATION OF HIERARCHICAL SEQUENCES
The aim of our investigations is to provide an insight into how the different events are correlated in a chemical plant.
The characterisation of these co-occurrences requires the probabilistic-based interpretation of the occurring events. Supposing a longer period of operation and, therefore, an event-log database, the assumption that the probability of the occurrence of a state (k = 0-length sequences s i ) is proportional to the number of its supporting events denoted by supp(s i ) can be acceptable:
By applying the a priori principle of frequent itemset mining for multiple levels of the hierarchy, it can easily be concluded that the probability of a state occurring on a higher level of the hierarchy is the sum of the probability of occurrence of the incorporated states on a lower level of the hierarchy. This hierarchical relationship is described in Equation 2:
To give a measure of the frequency of occurrences of a given state, the number of instances is normalised by the number of instances of the most frequent state in the given database as presented in Equation 3 :
where
, N denotes the number of states in the DB temporal database, E j is the set of events supporting state s j and |E j | is the cardinality of E j (the number of events in E j ) on the h level of the hierarchy. The frequency of occurrences of each pattern is measured by this support value, therefore, provides the basis for the determination of frequent sequences. Frequent patterns are usually defined by frequent pattern mining algorithms based on the support( ) ≥ minSupp equation, where the support threshold is denoted by minSupp, an input parameter of the algorithm. The goal of frequent pattern mining is to find all the frequent patterns for a given support threshold. In the case of multiple levels of the hierarchy, all the incorporating higher level states of a frequent state are consequently frequent. By reversing this concept and using the same support threshold on every level, the frequent states on higher hierarchical levels can be used to neglect infrequent ones on lower levels of the hierarchy. Consider an easily interpretable example. The s 1 state on level S 1 in the DB event log database presented in Table 1 is supported by three temporal instances (supp(s 1 ) = 3), while |E(1)| = max(3, 3, 2) = 3, therefore support(s 1 ) = 3/3 = 1. Similarly on level S 2 , |E(2)| = max(2, 1, 1, 2, 2) = 2, and thus with minSupp = 0.6, s 1,2 would be neglected as a frequent case, since s 1,2 = 1/2. Referring to the example of the Delayed Coker area presented in Section II-A, the number of every type of alarm can be characterised by a normalised measure compared to the number of the most frequent alarm in the plant.
Following this approach, the probability of transition from one state to another is proportional to the support value of the given sequence. The conditional probability of the occurrence of the state s k after a sequence k−1 ( k can be written
⇒ s k ) can be calculated as the quotient of the probability of occurrence of the longer and shorter sequences, which can be expressed by the number of occurrences (supp value) according to Equation 4:
The probability of the occurrence of a longer sequence can be calculated as the product of transition probabilities between each state of the sequence using the chain rule according to Equation 5 :
Following this approach, a measure of the reliability of the sequence can be defined, referred to as the confidence measure as presented in Equation 6 . It should be noted that the support gives a measure of how relevant the given sequence (in the given database) is, while the confidence describes its reliability.
It is important to highlight the difference between the confidence of a whole sequence, denoted as conf ( k ) and the confidence of the transition between states denoted as
, since the first describes the probability of the occurrence of the whole sequence, while the second measure describes the conditional probability of only the transition of the anticipating sequence to the consequential state or sequence, thus, the two quantities are not equal.
Referring back once again to the example of the Delayed Coker area in Section II-A, the support and confidence measures describe the frequency and probability (once the sequence has started what is the probability of the occurrence of the given sequence) of the occurrence of an event or event sequence, respectively. Therefore, how frequent the alarms in Absorber #1 follow the alarms in Coker Column #1, and once an alarm occurred in Coker Column #1 how sure one can be in that the next alarm will be in Absorber #1.
C. THE HIERARCHICAL MULTI-TEMPORAL MINING ALGORITHM
Formerly the algorithm published in [32] has been fine-tuned to make it more convenient for and applicable to alarm management purposes [3] . In the present paper, the algorithm is expanded further by implementing the handling of multiple levels of the hierarchy.
The pseudo code of the Hierarchical Multi-Temporal Mining method is described in Algorithm 1. The mining process starts at the highest level of the hierarchy. First, the frequent states of the hierarchical level are determined and stored in the F 1,0 variable, denoting the k = 0-length frequent patterns of the first hierarchical level. The longer k +1-length frequent pattern candidates are generated step by step by combining the known k-length frequent patterns and the events of the frequent states stored in F 1,0 . The candidates are tested against the support and confidence thresholds (minSupp and minConf ) and the frequent patterns are added to the F 1,k+1 variable containing the k + 1-length sequences of the first hierarchical level. This procedure continues until no more k + 1-length frequent patterns are to be expanded. Once the frequent temporal patterns of the highest level of the hierarchy are generated the algorithm progresses to the lower levels of Slist indicating the levels of the hierarchy which are intended to be mined in ascending order. The Hierlevelminer function requires the frequent patterns of the higher hierarchical level, the number of the level of the hierarchy for mining, and the states of the hierarchical level. The function revisits every temporal instance of the sequences belonging to the next higher level of the hierarchy and examines the temporal pattern of states on the defined hierarchical level of the given events if they are within the support and confidence thresholds. The frequent temporal patterns identified are stored in F h,k , where h and k indicate the examined level of hierarchy and sequence length, respectively.
To stimulate further research, the resultant MATLAB codes of the proposed sequence mining and alarm analysis algorithms are publicly available on the website of the authors (www.abonyilab.com).
D. MEASURING THE ORIENTATION OF THE PROPAGATION OF THE EFFECT OF PROCESS MALFUNCTIONS
In our investigations, the determination of the orientation of the propagation of malfunctions over the process is desired. In order to quantify the orientation of the revealed causal connections, the dependency measure originally applied in the field of process mining [29] has been used as presented in Equation 7 . This frequency-based metric indicates how certain the dependency between s 0 and s 1 is. The support values of sequences s 0 R 1 ⇒ s 1 are summarized for every type of temporal predicate (7), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
The dependency measure is always between -1 and 1. To illustrate its applicability, imagine a dataset where the generated 1-length frequent sequences of s 0 
end if 6 : end for
for every sequence ∈ C i do 12: if supp( ) ≥ minSupp 1 and conf ( ) ≥ minConf then 13 :
end if 15: end for 16 : for every temporal instance φ supporting do 27: dum = 0 28: for every event e ∈ φ do 29 :
end for 31: if dum / ∈ F h and supp(dum) ≥ minSupp h and conf (dum) ≥ minConf then 32: F h,i = F h,i ∪ {dum} 33: end if 34: end for 35 
The dependency measure is calculated from the number of occurrences of the analysed sequence. However, the confidence measure gives an insight into the probability of the pattern evaluating across the states of the revealed pattern. By applying this reliability measure, a metric called directionality can be defined which is calculated from the conditional probability of transition from the anticipating state to the following one as presented in Equation 8 . The confidence values of the sequences are summarised for all types of temporal predicates. It should be noted that in the case of a 1-length temporal pattern containing two states, the confidence measure and the conditional probability of state transition are identical. The directionality is a measure of how confident one can be in that once s 0 has occurred it will evolve into s 1 related to the confidence of the state s 1 evolving into s 0 over time. The directionality ranges between −1 and 1 similarly to the dependency and a value higher than 0 indicates that in the s 0
The dependency and directionality measures for 1-length temporal sequences containing 2 states have been applied, but both measures are applicable for longer sequences as well.
Using the defined dependency and directionality measures the orientation of the connections can be qualified. In the case of the example of the Delayed Coker area in Section II-A, the dependency and the directionality metrics help to reveal how determined the orientation of the spillover effect of a malfunction is. The connections with highly determined orientations should be validated by the process hierarchy (or control hierarchy), otherwise the control units could be
VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 3. The process flow diagram of the analysed industrial delay coker plant, for the easier interpretation of the symbols see [37] . The plant is divided into two main parts: one for the production of coke and one responsible for its separation.
miscalibrated, or the connection of the two alarms is the result of the high frequency of unfortunate co-occurrences.
The confidence of transition between states can be applied for the definition of a weighted directed graph to provide a global view of the propagation of process malfunctions. The nodes of the network are the process elements on the examined level of the hierarchy, while the weights are the confidence with regard to the propagation of the effect of malfunctions over the related nodes. This network-based representation is not just advantageous in terms of its illustrative visualisation, but it provides the opportunity to calculate centrality measures of network-theory. In the present work the PageRank [33] and betweenness measures [34] were applied. The applicability of the defined measures is presented in Section III-C.
E. VISUALISATION TECHNIQUES
During the presentation of the results, novel visualisation solutions have been developed and applied.
For the representation of the hierarchical structure and relative ratio of the hierarchical data, a sunburst chart-based visualisation has been proposed, which is a multilevel pie chart to visualise hierarchical data, depicted by concentric circles. In our work, the sunburst chart has been applied for the visualisation of the ratio of the alarms in and between the different hierarchical levels as presented and described in Section III-A.
It is hard to visualise such sequences and obtain a clear and illustrative overview of the results. To overcome this difficulty,a parallel coordinates-based visualisation technique has been developed. In general parallel coordinates are an effective way of visualising high-dimensional multivariate datasets, frequently applied by process engineers for the monitoring of processes [35] and can be conveniently applied for the visualisation of sequential patterns [36] .
However, in order to better fit the visualisation of the spillover effect of different malfunctions, the features of the parallel coordinates-based visualisation have been improved and modified: the sequence length is represented by the horizontal axis, while the vertical axis represents the different production units and the first production unit of the sequence is represented by the colour of the polyline. Moreover, the support of the different connections is represented by the thickness of the edge between two vertices. For example and more detailed description see Section III-B.
III. RESULTS & DISCUSSION
In this section, the historical alarm data of an industrial delayed coker plant is analysed. First, the analysed dataset is described and then the effectiveness of the proposed methodology is demonstrated. All the tag names and identifiers are masked due to confidentiality.
A. DESCRIPTION OF THE ANALYSED PROCESS
The methodology is demonstrated through the analysis of the delayed coker plant at the Danube Refinery of the MOL Group. An approximately 4-month-long operational period 50204 VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 4. Sunburst chart of the alarm database to visualise the alarm-count ratio with regard to the levels of the hierarchy. The circles represent the production units, units and sensors/actuators moving from inner circles to the outer ones. The numbers in the segments indicate the tag of the related process element.
was analysed with more than 2,000 process tag names on the level of sensors and actuators recorded in almost 400 units, located in 19 production units so that our example of application can be considered as a realistic and challenging case study. The process flow diagram of the analysed technology can be seen in Figure 3 . The method of data cleaning and preprocessing is described in details in Appendixes B and C.
In order to analyse and detect the extent to which individual events occur at each level of the hierarchy, a sunburst chart visualization was developed as presented in Figure 4 . The levels of hierarchy move outwards from the centre, and the inner small, the middle and the outer circles symbolize the ratio of alarms between the related production units, units and sensors/actuators, respectively. A segment of the inner circles holds a hierarchical relationship with the segments of the outer circles which lie within the angular sweep of the parent segment. The labels in the circular sectors indicate the tags of the production units, units and process variables (sensors/actuators). Therefore, it is highly conspicuous that process variable No. 1688 in unit No. 467 located in production unit No. 14 contributes significantly to the number of alarm counts. The sunburst chart is highly applicable for the illustration of the distribution of the recorded alarms on different levels of the hierarchy and how critical the operation of production units and units is. It is important to note that this is a very useful picture of the frequency of alarms and the expected loads of process operators.
The purpose of our work is, however, to go beyond this simple and useful data analysis to reveal the evolution of events in a temporal manner and the pattern of the spillover effect of process malfunctions. These results are presented in the next subsection.
Based on the results of former temporal analyses and following the expert knowledge of process engineers, a time window has been defined beyond which a causal connection between the occurring events is not presumed. If the event occurrences are divided by a longer time period than the defined time window it can be assumed that these events are part of a different event trace. Therefore, the occurring events have been segmented into event traces, which were considered the evaluation path of a process malfunction. By applying a 60-second-long time window for segmentation, VOLUME 6, 2018 10,272 event traces were derived with a minimum length of one event and a maximum length of 2,454 events. The average number of events in an event trace as a function of the first production unit of the event trace is illustrated in Figure 5 .
The defined event traces provide the opportunity to analyse the evaluation path of a process malfunction, which is the primary purpose of our investigations. These results are summarised in Section III-C.
B. HIERARCHICAL ALARM SEQUENCES OF THE ANALYSED DELAYED COKER PLANT
It must be highlighted that the exact values of alarm frequencies cannot be published, thus, the presented values are normalised or transformed. However, it is important to identify how the support threshold is determined on each level of the hierarchy. It is advisable to determine this parameter using a bottom-up approach, since by applying expert knowledge the minimum number of occurrences is determined, that need to be analysed in the case of each alarm. This information can be summed and converted into a higher level of the hierarchy. For easier interpretation, the minimum number of occurrences on every level of the hierarchy was 100 to calculate the support threshold. Therefore, the hierarchical multi-temporal sequence mining algorithm was applied to reveal frequently occurring alarm patterns on each level of the hierarchy with the calculated support thresholds, a confidence threshold of 0.01 and a time window of 60 seconds.
The visualization of causally connected process elements in time is suitable for the illustrative analysis of the spillover effect of a malfunction. To illustrate the proposed hierarchical approach, the drill-down graph presented in Figure 6 was created. The connections in decreasing order between levels of hierarchy from left to right are shown in the heatmaps. The values show the sum of support values of the sequences containing two elements (k = 1-length sequences) with the neglection of temporal predicates. The strong self-pointing inner connections are well illustrated in all three heatmaps, as the main diagonals of the figures contain the highest support values. However, there are some nice examples of sequences propagating between process elements, e.g. the spillover effect of a malfunction is shown by the alarm sequences pointing to production unit No. 4 from other production units.
The analysis of hidden connections by the relevant probability measures is aided by the sequence-based representation of discrete events, while the hierarchical information assists the incorporation of process-relevant information.
An important element of the proposed methodology is the definition of process periods that do not contain alarms as events, therefore, the event traces were completed with an extra event representing the normal operation, that is the start of the event trace. By analysing these sequences the generation of sequences that follow process malfunctions is ensured. In the following subsection, a novel methodology developed to analyse the causal relationship between process elements in the case of malfunctions on different levels of the hierarchy was introduced. 
C. SEQUENCE-BASED CAUSALITY ANALYSIS
The domino or spillover effect of malfunctions is informatively represented by the generated sequences, while the quantitative analysis and risk assessment is well-supported by the support values that reflect the probability of occurrence and the confidence values that represent the probability of spill-over. The support value can be easily interpreted as a normalised form of occurrence counts. However, the interpretation of confidence values can be harder. The confidence is a measure of the probability that the given sequences will follow the pattern appointed by the sequence elements. Therefore, it describes, after the occurrence of the first element, how sure the second element is and so on until the last element of the sequence has occurred.
To give a clear and illustrative overview of the generated sequences, a parallel coordinates-based visualisation technique has been developed as presented in Figure 7 . The sequence length is represented by the horizontal axis, while the production unit in which the given event occurred is shown by the vertical axis. Therefore, equally spaced copies of the y axis in every element of the x axis can be imagined. A k-length sequence is represented by a polyline with vertices on the imaginary equally spaced copies of the y axis and the position of the vertex on the i-th axis corresponds to the production unit in which the i-th event occurred. By using the implemented events that indicate faultless production at the beginning of every event trace, sequences can be generated starting with these faultless periods. The colour of the polyline is determined by the production unit where the first event of the sequence occurred (most probably the production unit where the malfunction occurred), while the thickness of the edges is proportional to their support value summarised for all the occurring temporal predicates, therefore, the thicker the edge, the higher the support value is. The polylines in Figure 7 highlight that the sequences start from different production units to varying extents. Moreover, strong cross effects exist between production units and back-and-forth connections can be observed as well, an illustrative example is the high number of links between production units No. 14 and 3, the utility system and the furnace of the delayed coker plant. Similar connection can be revealed between units No. 4 and 11, the coker drums and the separator of the C 3 -C 4 fractions. These connections can be validated by the hierarchical connections of the process as well, in addition, the spillover of the malfunctions usually goes through the utility systems as it was validated by the process experts.
An important factor is the causal dependency of production units, therefore, the orientation of causal relationships. To measure this extent, the dependency measure applied by the heuristic process mining algorithms was applied. The dependency measure is applicable to longer sequences as well, but it was applied for the characterisation of sequences containing two events. The heatmap of the dependency measures is shown by the left side of Figure 8 . It is interesting to examine the confidence of transitions between states, which provides the opportunity to detect the confidence of a malfunction spreading to another production unit as well. It should be noted that in the case of sequences containing only two states, the confidence of the sequence is equal to the confidence of transition between states. The calculated directionality measures of the state pairs that provide VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 7. The parallel coordinates-based visualisation of frequently occurring sequences. A sequence is represented by a polyline with vertices at the elements of the horizontal axis. The production unit in which the given sequence element occurred is indicated by the y-coordinate of the vertex. The colour of the polyline is determined by the production unit where the first event of the sequence occurred, while the thickness of the edges is proportional to their support value summarised for all the occurring temporal predicates. The spillover effect of malfunctions between production units is easily-observable. information on the confidence of the direction of the causal link is shown by the right side of Figure 8 .
By using connections having significant confidences, a network can be defined and analysed to identify critical process elements in the spreading of the effect of errors. Another illustrative visualisation of transition between states is the directed network-based visualisation presented in Figure 9 . The production units are shown by the nodes, while the orientation of the links and the confidence of transition between states are presented by the edges and the related weights, respectively. The confidence values are summarised for all the occurring temporal predicates between the related states. This network-based representation provides the opportunity to apply the centrality measures of network theory. It has been determined that the end and central production units of the sequences are characterised by high PageRank (15.17) . This approach provides an opportunity to coordinate the operator tasks, i.e. to group the units to operators based on their exposure during operation malfunctions.
The most important advantage of the hierarchical sequence-based approach for the generation of alarm connections is that it provides the opportunity to analyse lower levels of the hierarchy and reveal how the effect of a malfunction spreading from one production unit of the process to another as well as what units or sensors/actuators are involved. To demonstrate this, the sequences that change production units on the level of units and the sequences changing units on the level of sensors/actuators were determined. The connections and their confidence of transitions are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for units involved in the changing of production units and sensors/actuators involved in the changing of units. The low number of process elements suggests that in a well-designed control system the effect of a malfunction cannot spread over the whole plant, but should remain near its origin. The extracted knowledge can be utilised for the prioritisation of alarms and sequences. The revealed information can be validated using the expert knowledge of the technology.
D. SENSITIVITY & PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The proposed frequent pattern mining algorithm follows a top-down approach, i.e. it moves down from the higher levels of the hierarchy to the bottom ones, analysing the sequences of alarms at the given level of the hierarchy. The core concept of the proposed hierarchical sequence mining approach is that the sequences are mined at lower levels of the hierarchy based on the sequences revealed on a higher hierarchical level (and possibly validated by expert knowledge), preventing unconnected units at a lower hierarchical level from being part of the same sequence. In the search space constrained by the top-down approach, informative sequences can be revealed more efficiently. The method allows for the identification of process elements initiating the alarm sequences and the analysis of the domino-like spillover effect of malfunctions based on the evaluation pattern of alarm sequences. A parallel coordinate-based visualisation approach has been developed for the investigation of this effect that illustrates well how alarm signals from a given process element spread over the process.
According to our knowledge, the proposed manuscript is the first study that presents a novel algorithm that is able to generate frequent temporal sequences with the incorporation of the process hierarchy. There are other temporal or hierarchical sequence mining solutions, but this is the first attempt to merge these features into a single algorithm. However, we cannot compare our solution with the state-of-the-art algorithms, the effectiveness of the algorithm was compared with our formerly published algorithm, the Multi-Temporal Mining method (where the hierarchy of the dataset was not included in the analysis) [3] . In order to make the two algorithms comparable, both of them was modified to apply a minimal number of occurrences as the frequency threshold instead of the support value. This is recommended to avoid the effect of the composition of the analysed dataset on the input parameter of the mining algorithms since the support value represents the thresholds relative to the most frequent state. Figure 10 illustrates the runtime (top) and the number of generated sequences (bottom) as the function of the size of the analysed dataset. For the present comparison, a 20 seconds-long time window, 100 occurrences as support and 0.05 as confidence thresholds were chosen. In the case of Hierarchical Multi-Temporal Mining method, the support thresholds on the second and third levels of the hierarchy were determined to accept the sequences that are present at least ten times in the analysed dataset. The original method which did not include the hierarchical structure of the process was applied on the level of the sensors/actuators, and the number of sequences in the case of the Hierarchical Multi-Temporal Mining method presents the numbers on the level of the sensors/actuators as well to stay comparable. It is well-visible in Figure 10 that the novel Hierarchical Multi-Temporal Mining method outperforms our previous solution in both runtime and the number of found sequences. Moreover, the hierarchical breakdown of the sequences provides additional information on the ongoing processes to the process experts and operators.
IV. LIMITATIONS & FUTURE WORK
However, the proposed algorithm provides a fast solution for the generation of sequences at different hierarchical levels, and the presented visualisation techniques facilitate the overview of the resultant sequences, the expert knowledge of the process still cannot be neglected. The input parameters of the proposed algorithm are determined by the indepth knowledge of the process characteristic. The support and confidence threshold can be determined by the analysis of the frequency of occurrences and by the uncertainty of the spillover effect of different malfunctions. Taking into consideration that the time between the annunciation of two causally connected alarms is the time that the effect of a change in the process needs to take between the respective process elements, the time window to reveal connected events can be defined based on the analysis of the time constants of the process. In the light of this, the time-window parameter of the proposed algorithm is of critical importance, since the methodology is based on the assumption that given the knowledge of the technology and the occurring events, a time window can be defined above which no causal relationship is assumed between two events. The proposed approach is very effective in giving the opportunity for the definition of event traces and speeding up our algorithm by searching for only the sequences that start with the faultless production.
In a future work, the analyses of the effect of the input parameters of the algorithm on the generated sequences must be carried out to be able to define these parameters automatically based on the available information. With the increase of the support and confidence values, the core characteristic of the process can be revealed by neglecting the periodical outliers of the production. With the adequately high choice of confidence and support parameters and using a long time window, the significant connections between the distinct elements of the process can be revealed. To avoid the need for the expert knowledge during the validation of the technology, the automatic analysis of the process flow diagrams and P&IDs is a promising approach as well.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Alarm systems are crucial components of industrial processes for managing hazardous situations. However, due to the negligible cost of alarm definition in modern DCSs, the increasing number of uninformative and redundant alarm signals significantly hinders the work of the operators. Frequent pattern mining-based advanced alarm management is a promising approach for the exploration of redundant and co-occurring signals. To make pattern mining algorithms applicable to large industrial-scale datasets, a novel process hierarchybased solution was introduced. The methodology is based on the utilisation of the principles of decomposition and coordination as well as of the hierarchical structure of process variables, units and production units, preventing the generation of frequent, but uninformative, sequences. The revealed hierarchical sequences provide the opportunity to identify alarm sequences that cross more critical units and production units of the process, and the proposed quantitative measures help the qualification of the frequency of alarm occurrences, their severity from the view of operability, and their possible spillover effect as well as orientation. The network-based representation of alarm cascade evaluation paths is not just highly informative for process experts but gives the opportunity for the application of network theory-based centrality measures. The applied betweenness and PageRank measures show the central and end elements of sequences, respectively, and help in terms of operability the identification of critical process elements. These results can be applied to coordinate operator workloads and group the units to operators based on their exposure during operation malfunctions. Analysing the lower levels of hierarchy provides an insight into the critical units as well as sensors/actuators in the propagation of malfunctions by showing the elements involved in the spreading of the effect of malfunctions over production units or units. Besides the automatic definition of the input parameters of the presented algorithm, the applied operator actions and their quality are going to be analysed. Good quality alarm data is the prerequisite of advanced alarm management solutions [38] . The aim of our investigations is to explore informative connections between process alarms and plant topology with the determination of frequently occurring alarm patterns. To obtain informative sequences, less informative alarms, namely nuisance or constant ones, must be removed from the input database. The most common form of nuisance alarms are chattering ones, which do not sound for a sufficient time to allow the operators to perform corrective actions and in critical plant conditions can significantly hinder the work of the operators'. The chattering alarms are essentially in conflict with the philosophy that each alarm should be actionable. Similarly, constantly sounding alarms are also harmful to the quality of the alarm data. In an industrial environment, these longstanding alarms are ignored by the operators either as a result of their uninformativeness, or the fact that they are hidden from the operators as shelved or forbidden alarms (these alarms are usually still present in historical datasets). In order to identify chattering alarms, the chattering index introduced by Kondaveeti et al. [38] was applied and a cleaning methodology based on the counted chattering indices improved to avoid uninformatively short or long alarms. The applicability and effectiveness of the proposed methodology are presented through the analysis of the industrial delayed coker plant at the Danube Refinery of the MOL Group.
APPENDIX A ABBREVIATIONS

DCS
The basis for calculating the chatter index is the run-length distribution of the alarms. The run length (r) of an alarm is the time difference in seconds between two consecutive alarms on the same process variable. The run-length distribution (RLD) is the histogram of the different run lengths of the same alarm tag, therefore, it can be derived by summing up the frequency of different run lengths. Since process malfunctions prevail for a finite period of time and chattering alarms after a process malfunction do not last more than a specified time period (e.g. τ seconds), all run lengths greater than τ are ignored. In light of this, the RLD of the alarm tags can be normalized to a Discrete Probability Function (DPF) according to Equation 9 :
50212 VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 11. High density alarm plot (HDAP) of the production units. The number of alarms in the related process units cannot be published due to their confidentiality.
where P r,τ denotes the discrete probability of a run length r neglecting run lengths longer than τ and n r represents the number of alarms with the defined run length r in the examined time period.
r=τ r∈N n r is the normalisation factor, which is one less than the total number of alarms on the examined process variable and no longer than τ over the examined time period, since the last alarm does not have a defined run length.
The chatter index is defined by weighting the DPF by the inverse of the run length of the given alarm. The inverse of the run length is the frequency of its occurrence and is used to emphasise the alarm counts with short run lengths. In light of this, the chatter index (ψ τ ) can be calculated according to Equation 10 :
According to [39] , an alarm tag with a frequency of 3 or more alarms on the same tag in one minute can be considered as a chattering alarm tag. Thus, a cutoff limit of ψ was defined to identify the problematic tags. This cutoff value is ψ cutoff = 3 60 = 0.05 alarms/s. This cutoff value was applied as a rule of thumb for the removal of uninformatively short alarm run lengths from the investigated industrial database. After the calculation of the DPF, the probability values were summed up in reverse order starting from the value related to the longest analysed run length, until the total was equal to the cutoff value. The first element of these pairs of temporal instances related to the run-length values that would lead to the total DPF exceeding this limit was neglected. In this way a varying threshold for each alarm tag was defined with the intention to keep only the informative instances of each tag and reduce chattering.
APPENDIX C CLEANING AND PREPROCESSING OF THE ANALYSED DATASET
The present section describes the analysis, cleaning and preprocessing of the dataset according to the methods presented in the previous section (Appendix B).
An insight into how the intensity of the alarms varies with time in the 19 process units of the preprocessed database is given in Figure 11 in the form of a high density alarm plot (HDAP) [40] . The horizontal axis of the HDAP usually indicates the examined time domain divided into temporal bins of a certain length, while the vertical axis shows the top bad actors of the analysed alarm management system. The bins of this graph are colour-coded indicating the number of instances the corresponding alarm sounded during the related temporal period. As a reference for easier interpretation of the illustration, it should be noted that 300 alarms per day (one alarm every five minutes) is considered manageable by an operator according to the guidelines of the EEMUA [1] , although the number of alarms in the related process units cannot be published due to their confidentiality.
To identify chattering alarms, the modified chatter indices of each alarm tag were calculated as presented in the Appendix. Since it is known that nuisance alarms following an actual alarm will not last for more than a specified time period, run lengths in excess of 1,200 seconds (τ = 1200) were neglected and the modified chatter indices (ψ τ =1200 ) calculated. During the calculations only alarm tags with a minimum of 10 annunciations were considered due to practical reasons. The run-length distribution histogram illustrates the alarm counts with the related run lengths. The run lengths are indicated by the horizontal axis, while the alarm count is represented by the vertical axis. An example of the run length distribution of alarm tags can be seen in Figure 12 . The left-hand plot of the figure illustrates a highly chattering alarm; it is clearly visible from the high number of alarms with short run lengths and from the high value of the chatter index. In contrast, the right side of the figure shows an alarm tag that is more likely to possess informative temporal instances, as suggested by the smaller chatter index and the small number of very short run lengths.
The calculated chatter indices in ascending order of the alarm tags with the highest chatter indices are shown in Figure 13 . Based on the calculated chatter indices a run length limit was defined below which the temporal instances are ignored, this is indicated on the vertical axis on the right-hand side of Figure 13 , for a detailed description of the calculations see the Appendix. The recalculated modified chatter indices have also been plotted after the first temporal instances of the run lengths below the calculated threshold were cleared. As a result of clearing, the chatter index of the problematic alarm tags significantly decreased, although in some cases it is still above the defined cut-off value (0.05 alarms/s). This could be surprising, but after the clearing of certain temporal instances, alarms can still be present with short run lengths in the case of highly chattering tags.
For practical reasons, alarms that were too short or too long were also neglected. A reaction time of approximately 20 seconds for chemical process operators was suggested by Buddaraju [41] . Therefore, alarm instances shorter than 10 seconds were cleared from the database, as an alarm which occurs and vanishes within 10 seconds is assumed to be highly uninformative for the operators. To avoid longstanding alarms, alarms longer than two hours have also been cleared, as these alarms are considered to be either neglected by the operators, or shelved or suppressed in the DCS (but they are still visible in the historical database). After preprocessing, the analysed dataset contains 18 production units, 139 units and 358 sensors/actuators.
